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Abstract. Literature on knowledge protection strongly focuses on the application of measures, widely neglecting the abilities of individual firms. A capability view on firms could help to answer the question of how well they can utilize
different measures for protecting knowledge. Drawing on the resource-based
view, this paper proposes the concept of protection capabilities and discusses
how they could help firms to protect knowledge. Protection capabilities are
conceptualized as a capability model that mirrors the identification, assimilation, and application capabilities as defined in the model of absorptive capacity.
As a result, firms need to develop three types of capabilities: (1) concealment to
protect their resources, (2) ambiguity to protect their capabilities and (3) enforcement to protect their business strategies. This paper discusses how each
capability type reduces the risk of external organizations absorbing knowledge,
and gives examples of what role IT plays in building each of the capability
types.
Keywords: knowledge protection, capabilities, resource-based view, absorptive
capacity, knowledge-based view

1

Introduction

Literature on knowledge protection strongly focuses on the application of formal
and informal measures [1-3] mainly addressing the question of how effective can different protection measures be applied. Characteristics like firm size [4, 5], affiliation
to specific industry sectors [4, 5], or resource characteristics [6] have been identified
as factors influencing the effectiveness of protection. Rarely attention has been paid to
individual firms’ abilities to protect. However, the effectiveness of knowledge protection depends on the individual company and situational aspects [7] and, hence,
knowledge protection should be more than applying formal measures in a generalized
way [8, 9]. Instead of solely focusing on how effective different measures can be
applied, literature should stronger focus on how well can a specific firm utilize different measures. One perspective that accounts for individual organizational abilities to
protect is the concept of capabilities. Capabilities are routines and processes which
make use of a specific combination of resources [10, 11]. In knowledge protection
literature, this capability perspective has been discussed from the resource-based view
(RBV) in two ways: (1) knowledge protection as a set of capabilities itself and (2)
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measures to reduce the risk that external organizations1 absorb knowledge [12], or
influencing factors thereof [6]. In (1), authors discuss capabilities for knowledge protection [3, 13, 14], however, do not always make clear distinctions between the concepts of capabilities and resources and, hence, it remains unclear what the nature of
protection capabilities is. For (2), the focus is on proposing protection measures or
identifying influencing factors of reducing the risks that externals absorb knowledge.
However, this view does not focus on protection capabilities.
This paper tries to address these issues following the call by Desouza and
Vanapalli [14] for a stronger focus on protection capabilities in knowledge protection
literature, e.g. by developing capability models. Protection capabilities are introduced
and conceptualized as a model that helps firms to reduce the risk that externals identify, assimilate, and apply knowledge as defined in the model of absorptive capacity.
Moreover, the model tries to explain two things: (1) what is protected by the proposed
capabilities, i.e. core knowledge (resource level), knowledge capabilities (capability
level), or the business strategy of a firm (strategy level). And (2) where is the impact,
i.e. on reducing the risk that externals identify, assimilate, or apply knowledge.

2

Foundations

The following foundation section is based on a profound literature review [15] and
describes one specific part of it, i.e. knowledge protection from the perspective of the
RBV.
2.1

Knowledge Protection

Knowledge protection is about the prevention of (a) unwanted knowledge spillovers [16], (b) knowledge loss [17], and (c) the reduction of knowledge visibility
[18]. (a) Focuses on leakage of knowledge to not authorized people, (b) on leaving or
retiring employees, and (c) is concerned with observability of knowledge by externals. Hence, knowledge protection focuses on the confidentiality aspect of knowledge
and has to be differentiated from the wider concept of knowledge security. The latter
is concerned with both external and internal confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of knowledge [19] which is not the focus of this paper.
Literature on knowledge protection argues from three theoretical lenses [9]: transaction cost theory (TCE) [3], the relational perspective [6, 20], and the RBV [12, 13].
TCE scholars suggest that firms should rather use equity- based partnerships to protect knowledge. The relational perspective focuses on how relational capital, i.e. mutual trust, respect, and friendship in inter-organizational relationships helps to protect
knowledge.

1

In the following referred to as externals and described both organizations in a partnership with
the focal firm as well as competitors.
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2.2

Knowledge Protection and the Resource-Based View of the Firm

Scholars occupying the RBV argue that a firm can sustain its competitive advantages only when their competitors cannot acquire or imitate the firm’s capabilities
and resources [21], whilst there is a need to leverage resources from outside of the
firm due to limited internal resources [22]. Central to RBV are the concepts of resource, capability, and business strategy. A firm’s resources are input into a firm’s
production process [10], are manifold and can be separated into tangible resources
and intangible resources [23]. Tangible ones are financial or physical resources,
whilst intangible ones can be further separated into person-independent resources
(intangible assets, organizational culture, routines) and person dependent resources
(tacit and explicit knowledge) [23]. Capabilities are “integrated combinations, consolidations or applications of resources in an organizational context” [23]. They involve
complex patterns of various resources and people, and are made up of a sequence of
coordinated actions, i.e. organizational routines [10]. Substantive capabilities are routines that make use of the resources in a sense that they provide a set of decision options for a firm [11, 24]. Dynamic capabilities refer to the ability to change or reconfigure substantive capabilities [11]. After building capabilities firms have to appraise
the rent-generating potential of resources and capabilities as well as to select a business strategy exploiting the resources and capabilities best, relative to external opportunities to build and sustain competitive advantage [23].
From the perspective of the RBV, there are several important implications for
knowledge protection. First, during the last twelve years, knowledge-based resources
became more and more recognized as critical for a firm’s competitive advantage [6,
22, 23]. Hence, the protection of knowledge and knowledge capabilities becomes vital
for firms to stay competitive. Second, only few scholars began to recognize the importance of capabilities to protect knowledge [e.g.,13] as they allow to incorporate
peculiarities of individual firms. Third, only few scholars highlighted that effective
protection of a focal firm’s knowledge also depends on how it can deal with the capabilities of externals to absorb core knowledge [e.g.,12]. These capabilities of externals
have been widely referred to as absorptive capacity (ACAP) and are introduced in the
following.
2.3

Absorptive Capacity

Although there is a broad range of conceptualizations for ACAP [25], it is widely
known as a firms’ set of capabilities to identify, assimilate, and apply external
knowledge to commercial ends [26]. A firm’s ACAP is positively influenced by IT
capabilities and complementary organizational capabilities [11]. IT capabilities are
outside-in, inside-out and spanning capabilities. Outside-in refers to the identification
of external knowledge, e.g. inter-organizational electronic interfaces. Inside-out refers
to the application of knowledge, e.g. employees’ basic IT skills. Spanning capabilities
facilitate the assimilation of knowledge, i.e. the integration of outside-in and insideout by linking new knowledge with what the firm already knows [11, 27]. Complementary organizational capabilities refer to coordination and socialization. Coordina-
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tion “enhance[s] knowledge exchange across intra- and inter-organizational boundaries” [11], e.g. a team that monitors a virtual community (outside-in capability). Socialization “creates the conditions necessary to exchange knowledge” [11], e.g. shared
language or common goals.
To propose capabilities that reduce the risk that externals identify, assimilate, and
apply knowledge and knowledge capabilities, this paper uses ACAP as a reference
model. That is because there is vast literature on ACAP [28] as a widely accepted
model for explaining an organization’s ability to identify, assimilate, and utilize
knowledge.

3

Towards a Capability Model for Knowledge Protection

After introducing the basic concepts, it is necessary to relate them. Therefore, it is
necessary to clearly describe the concept of protective capability.
3.1

Protection Capabilities

In literature on knowledge protection the concept of capabilities has either been
used synonymous to that of resource or the differentiation between them remains
vague. Hence, two questions remain unsolved in knowledge protection literature concerning the differentiation between resources and capabilities. First, what exactly are
protection capabilities and how do they differ from protection resources? This question refers to the characteristics of resources and capabilities introduced earlier. Similar to RBV literature, protection resources are also inputs to a production process with
protected knowledge as outcome, knowledge capabilities, and protected business
strategy. Opposed to that, most knowledge protection literature focuses on protection
resources. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are treated as intangible assets [1], protection related know-how as person-dependent resource [29] technical measures as
physical resources [14], HR mechanisms like top management support as persondependent resources [2] just to mention a few examples. However, on their own, few
protection resources are productive. As an example, individual patents do not prevent
imitation or substitution in some industries and, hence, firms need build specific combinations of patents, i.e. patent fences to protect their innovations [30]. Another example is that the specific combination of skills makes a product complex and exacerbates imitation by externals [31]. Hence, firms need to build teams of protection resources, specific combinations of coordination between resources and people as well
as between people.
The second question is what do protection capabilities protect? This question refers to the boundary of protection capabilities, i.e. where they have the power to protect and where protection is beyond their scope. Taking the example from above, the
capability of building patent fences strives to protect knowledge embedded in processes and products [3] and, hence, to protect a resource. As protective capabilities
are complex patterns of resources and people which hold tacit knowledge, patent
fences cannot be considered to protect each type of organizational capabilities as the
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protection of tacit knowledge is beyond their scope [3]. This example indicates that
the question of what capabilities ought to protect cannot be determined in a general
way. To answer this question, ACAP can be used as a reference model to which protection capabilities are mirrored against. Depending on whether externals try to identify, assimilate, or apply knowledge, the focal firm has to protect resources, capabilities, or its business strategy. This is explained in the following. Identifying external
knowledge: identifying means observing knowledge which is determined by the extent of disclosure [32] and recognizing its value [33]. Capabilities, however, are not
observable as they are invisible phenomena [34]. As a consequence, protection capabilities to reduce the risk of knowledge identification have to focus on knowledge, i.e.
the resource level. Assimilating identified knowledge: once identified, externals have
to assimilate knowledge of the focal firm, i.e. to embed it into the existing knowledge
base. The outcome of assimilation is a new organizational capability [35] as externals
try to combine the identified knowledge with their other resources. However, to be
able to imitate a capability, the absorbing organization needs to understand causal
relationships between the knowledge identified, and other resources and people that
constitute the capability. Hence, protection capabilities of firms reducing externals’
assimilation capabilities focus on the protection of capabilities. Applying assimilated
knowledge: once knowledge has been identified and assimilated, externals need to put
it into practice, i.e. to build a business strategy that exploits the assimilated
knowledge best by assuring appropriability of returns [10, 23]. In this respect, a focal
firm can reduce the risk that externals make use of the imitated capability. Here, protection capabilities operate on protecting a firm’s business strategy, by ensuring the
appropriability of returns [10, 23].
Using ACAP as a framework, this paper proposes protection capabilities that help
firms to reduce the risk of identification, assimilation, and application of their
knowledge. These protection capabilities are proposed in the following. Since capabilities are combinations of resources, and since the IT artifact is under-researched in
knowledge protection literature [36] there is a stronger focus on what role IT plays in
building each of the capability types.
3.2

Concealment, Ambiguity, and Enforcement

Starting from ACAP, this paper argues that firms can reduce the risk that
knowledge is identified, assimilated, and applied by establishing concealment, ambiguity, and enforcement capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates the capability model. In the
following, the three types of protection capabilities are proposed.
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Figure 1: A capability model for knowledge protection

Concealment capabilities: leveraging resources from outside is crucial for organizations due to their limited internal resources [22]. In this respect ACAP postulates
that organizations need to develop capabilities to identify external knowledge [11,
26]. More concretely, the observability of knowledge reflects the capability of externals to identify strategic knowledge of a focal firm [37]. Hence, reducing the observability can be understood as reducing externals’ capabilities to identify the knowledge.
Observability depends on two characteristics: the “extent of disclosure” [32], as well
as the ease of ”understanding and examining different aspects” of the knowledge [33].
In other words, the success of externals to identify knowledge of a focal firm depends
on the level of disclosure and if the knowledge can easily be recognized as valuable.
Here, some firms are able to manage to be less transparent or open than others [38].
As a consequence, firms need to learn how to do so and develop protection capabilities that reduce the level of observability [3, 18]. This includes knowledge in people
as well as process and product knowledge [39]. The level of disclosure is often determined by technical measures and prominently discussed in information security literature which are well applicable for explicit knowledge [39]. Here, Role-based access
control-techniques are proposed for Knowledge Management System (KMS) design
[40] which is especially important for inter-organizational workflows [41] and collaborative systems [42]. Another way of IT enhancing firms to reduce observability is
(semi-) automation of text sanitization [43]. Together with intentionally using less
rich media for transmission for specific cases [8], such technologies provide the capability to hide sensitive knowledge in documents [43] and protect them from externals’
observation. However, these measures themselves are no capabilities. Hence, the
establishment of routines by combining and coordinating IT resources with people
and other protection resources is crucial. One important aspect in this respect is the
establishment of routines to increase security awareness to hinder protection measures
to be bypassed. Similar to what Roberts et al. [11] describe as developing a shared
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ideology towards knowledge transfer, knowledge protection also requires shared language, common goals, or cohesion [29]. A firm needs to establish an adequate level of
knowledge protection awareness to ensure that protection measures to reduce disclosure of knowledge can be established. For example, employees might not know what
to protect and what not if they are not aware of the firm’s competitive knowledge [2].
An example of such a capability that combines and enhances coordinating protection
measures to reduce disclosure with people involved in protection processes is a KMS
that helps “firstly to store and communicate security related knowledge contents and
secondly to allow users to compare their security-relevant activities with security
policies, and to either suggest on security policy amendments or additions to training
programs” [44].
To reduce the recognition of the value of knowledge, increasing its contextualization is helpful. Contextualization can be understood as the process of embodying explicit knowledge into implicit knowledge [45] and, hence, can be referred to as internalization [46]. In this paper the focus is on internalization within organizational
boundaries. Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in an individual’s commitment to a
specific context and action [46], and hence it is more difficult for an external observer
to recognize the value of tacit than explicit knowledge. That is, because increasing
contextualization of knowledge requires an external to have a higher level of prior
related knowledge to recognize its value. Prior related knowledge of a firm is the
existing domain-specific knowledge base [11]. New knowledge is related to this prior
knowledge to be able to be absorbed. Externals with a low level of prior knowledge
cannot simply forward tacit knowledge like documents to someone who has a higher
level. Although contextualization can be considered as a capability itself [35], combination of routines with IT is of value. Increasing computer-based communication is
one solution [47] although it might sound counter-intuitive for a moment. However, it
is important to notice that such systems should be established within organizational
boundaries and separated from communication channels with externals. To internalize
on an organizational level, explicit knowledge has to be shared [46] and integrating
internal computer-based communication systems, together with the capabilities to
reduce disclosure described above, help to spread explicit knowledge throughout but
within the boundary of the organization.
Ambiguity capabilities: as mentioned, assimilation serves to produce new organizational capabilities [35]. ACAP postulates that externals can better assimilate and
apply knowledge gained from a focal firm when they have similar resources, e.g.
skills, or knowledge [6]. That is because it takes more to assimilate and imitate capabilities than just exposing individuals to new knowledge. One way of reducing the
externals capabilities to assimilate is to establish and maintain causal ambiguity.
Causal ambiguity describes the nature of causal relationships between actions and
results [48] and helps to build barriers to imitation [31]. Increasing causal ambiguity
makes it difficult for externals to comprehend the competencies on which certain
outcomes are based [31]. Consequently, causal ambiguity protects on the capability
level as it exacerbates to understand how different resources and people are combined
and coordinated together with the already identified knowledge so that they can imitate the capability. One aspect to increase causal ambiguity is to increase complexity
of a firm’s competencies, i.e. capabilities themselves [31]. Complexity refers to patterns of “interdependent technologies, routines, individuals, and resources linked to a
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particular knowledge” [38]. Increased complexity makes capabilities more difficult to
comprehend by externals [10] because “the causes of success and failure are often
difficult to assign…[and]…the establishment of cause-effect relationships can be very
difficult" [49]. As a consequence, firms need an ambiguity capability that helps to
create complex skill patterns, resource deployments [31] as well as complex relationships between capabilities different from the knowledge base of externals. One important factor of complexity is integrating broad-spans of different knowledge-based
resources into capabilities [38]. Drawing on the argumentations above, the key to an
ambiguity capability is that the focal firm should be able to integrate across the broadspans of knowledge-based resources to understand the causal relationships [38] whilst
externals should not. For the integration part, KMS integrate broad-spans of
knowledge helping firms to locate documents, update knowledge elements, coordinate
KM tasks etc. [23]. However, firms need to be able to control who is involved in integrative operations in KMS to assure that the complexity of relationships between
knowledge-based resources, routines, people etc. cannot be understood by externals.
Here, using security concepts like role-based access control or obligation- and condition-based usage control for knowledge management systems [40] is valuable. Firms
can control who has access to what and define conditions and obligations underlying
an activity that is performed using a KMS. This way, firms can steer who is able to
understand the causal relationships in what way.
Furthermore, increasing contextualization of knowledge also helps firms to exacerbate assimilation of knowledge by externals as the decision rules and protocols are
hard to codify through “the skilled operator’s own level of unawareness” [31]. And,
hence, an external cannot fully understand how actions and results relate with increasing tacitness [31]. This relationship between causal ambiguity and contextualization
highlights that reducing observability by increasing tacitness of core knowledge also
reduces the risk of assimilation.
Enforcement capabilities: ACAP literature proposes that, besides capabilities to
identify and assimilate, externals need to be able to apply knowledge which can be
achieved by means of inside-out capabilities. In other words, once externals assimilated knowledge and built capabilities therewith, they need to put it into practice, i.e.
build a business strategy that exploits the assimilated knowledge best by assuring
appropriability of returns [10, 23]. This paper argues that a focal firm needs protection
capabilities to reduce the risk that externals apply knowledge. There are basically two
ways discussed in literature to protect knowledge after being disclosed and assimilated. Protection (1) via IPR [1, 3] and (2) building trust to prevent externals from opportunistic behaviour [6]. However, trust building implies willingness to form organizational partnerships. Since firms also need to reduce the risk of utilizing knowledge
by competitors or even unknown players in the market, the aspect of building trust is
neglected here. In terms of IPR, single patents may not prevent imitation or substitution and, hence, firms need build capabilities, i.e. specific routines to establish and
maintain patent fences [30]. Here, combining patent fences with IT that supports to
manage them is of value. In this respect, property asset management systems or enterprise intellectual asset management systems [50] provide firms with analysis tools,
databases, as well as matching algorithms to find similar intellectual properties of
externals or incompatibilities between patents of the focal firm.
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Another point is that, similar to what ACAP proposes, firms also need to manage
dependencies among its various activities to enhance protection, i.e. build an overarching protection strategy [29] to protect the business strategy. A firm’s enforcement
capability also refers to the establishment of an overarching protection strategy to
effectively apply IPR. Drawing from information security literature, firms need to
establish IPR requirements, controls to enforce them, as well as auditing procedures
[51]. One approach could be seen in the IT architecture proposed by [52]: Adapted to
knowledge protection firms should establish links between high-level IPR protection
requirements, controls and configurations of property asset management systems or
enterprise intellectual asset management systems. Through these linkages, firms can
build the capability to measure performance of IPR protection to prevent leaks that
could lead to appropriation [18]. By constantly monitoring the compliance status of
IPR protection requirements, a firm is able to evaluate the enforcement of protection
via IPR. This also enables firms to change or reconfigure their substantive enforcement capabilities [cf. 11]. Helpful in this respect could be technologies that enable
continuous auditing, e.g., by using a process mining approach for constantly checking
for compliance [53].

4

Discussion

Knowledge protection literature mainly focuses on the effectiveness of applying
measures in a generalized way, widely ignoring abilities of individual firms in how
they can build capabilities around the measures. Drawing on the RBV, this paper
addresses this problem presenting a model that (1) proposes three types of protection
capabilities. (2) This paper argues how these protection capabilities help to reduce the
risk that knowledge is identified, assimilated, and utilized. (3) This paper differentiates between the levels on which protection capabilities operate: protecting resources,
capabilities, or the business strategy of a focal firm. Concerning (1) this paper goes
beyond current knowledge protection literature as it clearly distinguishes between the
concepts of resource and capability and provides concealment, ambiguity, and enforcement capability types. Concerning (2) the model considers peculiarities of individual firms by the fact that the firms’ own protection capabilities are mirrored
against the ACAP of individual external organizations. Here, concealment help to
reduce the risk to identify knowledge, ambiguity to reduce assimilation, and enforcement to reduce application. Concerning (3) the paper anchors the concept of protection capabilities in the RBV by arguing that concealment capabilities protect
knowledge resources, ambiguity capabilities protect knowledge capabilities, and enforcement capabilities protect the business strategy of a firm.
4.1

Implications

Managerial implications: First of all firms might rethink their approach to
knowledge protection. Although, many firms do not have knowledge protection on
their radar [54], those who do should not consider protection solely as application of
measures [cf. 29] but rather as a set of capabilities. Firms could ask themselves “what
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protection capabilities do we need to protect our knowledge, our capabilities and our
business strategy”, “how can we build, or enhance these capabilities”, or “how do we
have to reconfigure them depending on the ACAP of externals”. In the course of this
firms might think of how IT resources can be used to build protection capabilities.
Here, they can consider the use of new technology enhancing capabilities like KMS
that incorporate user knowledge on security awareness [44].
Research implications: There are several implications for research from introducing this capability model. First of all, this paper tries to highlight the need to sharpen
the different concepts of resources and capabilities. Protection resources themselves
often fail to adequately protect [30], whilst their combination with other protection
resources help firms to deal with externals’ ACAP. This leads to the second point: this
paper tries to shift the focus in knowledge protection literature from the application of
protection resources to their combination and utilization as protection capabilities.
This enables to consider the peculiarities of individual firms and, hence, helps them to
balance sharing and protecting. This so called boundary paradox [6, 9] refers to the
need of firms to access external knowledge due to limited resources and protect internal knowledge. Recently, no literature provides solutions to solve it.
4.2

Boundaries of the research and further research

It is necessary to explicate the boundaries of this conceptual paper as there are
some limitations to the explanatory power and comprehensiveness of the model.
Explanatory power of the model: This model makes no statements on the extent to
which the capabilities can reduce identification, assimilation, and application. In this
respect, further studies need to investigate the influential strength of the capabilities
on (1) externals’ ACAP and (2) the focal firm’s overall protection performance. With
respect to (1) no work could be found that makes statements thereon and, hence, further exploratory studies are of importance. For (2), literature indicates that to a certain
extent, contextualization can even be effective “for resolving comprehension difficulties arising from the users' lack of task domain knowledge“ [55]. Similarly, a too high
level of causal ambiguity leads to a situation where even employees of the focal firm
do not understand how actions and outcomes relate [31]. Further studies need to investigate the relationships of concealment, ambiguity, and enforcement capability
with a firm’s protection performance and associated coordination costs. Furthermore,
the model makes no statements on the relationships between the capabilities themselves. As indicated, the level of contextualization positively influences causal ambiguity [38]. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that concealment capabilities affect ambiguity capabilities. In other words, firms that increase tacitness of knowledge might
also increase causal ambiguity. Further studies should also investigate how concealment and ambiguity capabilities relate to enforcement capabilities.
Comprehensiveness of the model: The paper does not claim that the proposed set
of capability types is comprehensive. It might occur in further studies that there are
more than three types of capabilities reducing the ACAP of externals. Additionally
the IT resources are of exemplary character. Due to the fact that the IT artifact is
mainly absent in knowledge protection literature [36] it might be of value to perform
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deeper investigations on which IT might contribute in what way to the three capability
types.
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